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STUDENT POWER AT THE POLLS
RICHARD SINGER*
Despite vehement White House opposition, the overwhelming vote in
both houses of Congress to lower the voting age to 18,1 thereby adding
another 11 million voters to the rolls,' indicates a growing awareness that
if the youth of the country are going to be kept in the %ystem," they must
first be allowed to come into it. The single most effective way of achiev-
ing this end, short of revolution, is the ballot box, since the vote pos-
sesses a coercive force which even money cannot directly achieve. Yet,
unless some state legislatures change their statutes or constitutions, 3 many
students are going to be given less than their full participatory role in
democracy, notwithstanding the recent federal legislation.
The potential watering-down of student interest and student power at
the polls arises because of statutes which, as interpreted by antagonistic
voter registration boards, preclude students from voting for local candi-
dates in the town in which they are attending college. These "residency-
determinative" statutes provide generally that no person shall "lose or
gain" residency for purposes of voting registration "by attending an insti-
tution of learning." This language can be interpreted to mean, as it was
at least by the Board of Registrars in Tuscaloosa County, Alabama, that
a student is effectively precluded from enrolling as a registered voter of
the "university town" if he was not born or raised there. The practical
effects are intriguing: the student who, entering college at age 18 as a
freshman, is still in the university town at age 25 attending graduate
school, must vote in the county from which he came at age 18. In
Harris v. Samuels,4 several attorneys and I, as members of the American
Civil Liberties Union, challenged the application of such an interpreta-
tion as unconstitutional. This article will treat those arguments, as well
as considerations which were not raised in the litigation.
I. THE FACTUAL SITUATION IN TUSCALOOSA COUNTY
Prior to October, 1968, the Tuscaloosa Board of Registrars had allowed
those students who were willing to sign a statement that they intended
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati. The author was counsel in Hanis v.
Saauels, - F.2d - (5th Cir. 1971), from which this article sprang. Some of the material
comes from the brief in that case, on which ir. Reber Boult and Mr. Norman Siegal, of the
Atlanta Regional Office of the Atlanta Civil Liberties Union, and Mr. George Longshore, of the
Alabama Civil Liberties Union, were collaborators.1 Pub. Law 91-285 (June 22,1970), 38 U.S.L.W. 99 (1970).
2 N.Y. Times, June 19, 1970, P. 36, col. 5.
3 Twenty-four states, including Alabama, have such statutes; for a complete breakdown,
including cases interpreting such provisions, see the appendix at the end of this article. The
constitutionality of the act is presently before the court. Oregon v. Mitchell, No. 43 Orig.;
Texas v. Mitchell, No. 44 Orig.; United States v. Arizona, No. 46 Orig.; United States v. Idaho,
No. 47 Orig.
4 - F. Supp. - (Civ. Action No. 68-598, S.D. Ala. 9 February 1970) (appeal pending).
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to reside in Tuscaloosa County after graduation to register and vote in
that county. 5 In 1968, however, a black man, William McKinley Branch,
had the audacity to run for the United States House of Representatives
seat for the Fifth District of Alabama, of which Tuscaloosa County was
by far the most populous portion. There were several other candidates
in the race. Branch was running on the newly-formed, mostly black-
oriented New Democratic Party of Alabama. There was the other "Dem-
ocratic" candidate, Walter Flowers, supported by George Wallace, a Re-
publican candidate, and a conservative party candidate.
The Branch campaign attracted national publicity and attention. An
ad in the New Republic brought added campaign funds to the area, and
there were several other contributions from national organizations and
figures. Thus, it appeared at the time that Branch had at least an out-
side chance of winning the seat, especially if the black voters, approxi-
mately 1/3 of the registered voters in the Fifth District, could be gotten
out in force.'
There were some 5,000 to 6,000 students of voting age at the University
of Alabama in Tuscalosa. Although it is highly unlikely that the majority
would have voted for Branch, those who would have so voted were perhaps
the single most vocal group on campus. It thus must have appeared to the
townspeople that a large percentage of the students at the University
would have voted for Branch, a black man, if they could have registered
in Tuscaloosa County. Indeed, W. D. Samuel, Chairman of the Board of
Registrars, remarked to more than one student who attempted to register
on the possibility of students "throwing" the election.
In October, then, with the campaign in full swing and students arriv-
ing back on the campus after summer vacation, the Board developed a
new policy of refusing to register any student who had not lived in the
county prior to matriculation ("nonnative" students) .7  When these
students informed the members of the Board that they were willing to
sign statements of intent, which previously had been sufficient for regis-
tration, the Board flatly refused. At that point, the students came to the
Civil Liberties Union of Alabama, of which I was then state chairman.
Informal negotiations were first attempted, but it was soon obvious
5 These facts were disputed, and the District Court rejected this version. Nevertheless,
it was general knowledge at the campus that such a statement would assure registration. Of
the documents introduced at trial, 72% of the registered "non-native" students had such state-
ments on their application. Such a high percentage tends to belie the belief that there was
no compulsion involved in their making.
6In xetrospect, of course, this looks starry-eyed, particularly after George Wallace's defeat
of Albert Brewer in the 1970 primary, after the NDPA had had two more years to organize.
Nevertheless, the overwhelming black victory in Greene County, after the Supreme Court deci-
sion in Hadnott v. Amos, 394 U.S. 358 (1969), a county adjacent to Tuscaloosa County, indi-
cates there was strength to be tapped.
7 The trial evidence later developed that the board would also register students who worked
more than they attended class, students who already had secured a post-graduate job, and stu-
dents whose parents had moved to Tuscaloosa subsequent to their child's matriculation.
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that these would be futile. Moreover, time was quickly running out since
the Board had changed its policy only in the first week of October and
would be open only until the end of the second week. Early in the second
week of October, we went to Federal District Court seeking an injunction.
A hearing was held on Wednesday before the Honorable H. H. Grooms
requiring the Board to register every student who was willing to sign a
statement that he intended to reside in Tuscaloosa after graduation and
would not double vote in the forthcoming elections. Although there was
some consternation about the "after graduation" language, the decree
seemed to be the best we could hope for prior to the election, and we were
quite pleased with the outcome as a whole.
The pleasure was not to last long. As we later found out, as soon as
suit was filed on Monday, October 14, the Board of Registrars had lost all
control over its own destiny. The State Sovereignty Commission, a statu-
torily-created body whose duty is to "protect the sovereignty of the state
of Alabama from encroachment thereon by the federal government . . .
and to resist by all legal means, the usurpation by any agency of the fed-
eral government . . rights and powers reserved to the states. . . ." took
over. The Commission immediately drew up a questionnaire to use for
students.8 That questionnaire was used between Wednesday and Friday for
every student who attempted to register. Additionally, while the practice
earlier had been to inform the registrant of his registration immediately,
8 The questionnaire, in full, is printed here:
VOTER REGISTRATION STUDENT QUESTIONNAIRE
(Fill out for every applicant who is college student or wife of student)
FULL NAME -----------------------------------------------------
Place where you reside----------------- --------
Check one or both:------------------------
I am a student Husband is a student
(Wife's residence is determined by her husband's unless she was a resident before mar-
riage and remained so.)
1. Where did you attend high school?----------------------------------
2. Date entered college here:-----------------------------------------
3. Date moved to this County:----------------------------------------
4. Home address on file at college:-------------- -----
5. Where are you a student?-------- -----------
6. Do you pay out-of-state college fees? No ---- Yes ----
7. If you lived in this County and State before becoming a
student, give dates of beginning of residence: State:
County: ------
8. If you resided in another state or county before becoming a
student, give state and county: State:------------------
County:--------------
9. If you were a resident of another state or county before becomming
a student, answer this question: Do you own a lot, residence
or business property located in this county? Yes ---- No ----
If so, give type and location: -
On what date was it purchased?
10. To what state do you pay income tax? Alabama ---- Other ----
11. Do you swear under oath that you intend to continue to keep
your bona fide residence in this county AFTER leaving
college or graduation? Yes ---- No ----
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students were said to be "applicants for registration" who would be noti-
fied as to the success of their "'application" at some later date (assumedly
prior to the election).
One week before the election, the letters arrived. Over sLxty "non-
native" students were denied registration. The board gave three reasons,
any one of which was sufficient for disqualification: 9 (1) the student did not
evince enough intent to remain after graduation; (2) the student did not
own property, such as a business or lot, in Tuscaloosa County; (3) the stu-
dent did not pay income tax to Alabama.
Early Monday morning, Judge Grooms issued to the three members of
the Board of Registrars an order to show cause why they should not be
held in contempt of court. A compromise was reached on the representa-
tion that the 64 exclusions were made in "good faith error." Almost all
were allowed to vote the next day.
After trial, however, the District Court, per Judge Seybourn Lynne,"0
held against plaintiffs, finding no evidence that the Board had discrimin-
ated against students in general, or against "'nonnative" students as op-
posed to "native" students.
II. THE MERITS OF THE CASE
A. The Practical and Policy Consideratzons
The traditional justifications for voter residence requirements are four:
(1) the promotion of a more intelligent vote by insuring that voters have
at least had an opportunity to obtain some knowledge of local affairs;
(2) prevention of fraud; (3) identification of the voter; (4) assurance
12. Do you intend to continue to own your property
here after that time? Yes ---- No ----
13. Do you intend to pay state income taxes
here after that time? Yes ---- No ----
14. Check which best describes what you
intend your residence to be: Permanent ---- While in school ----
Applicant's signature: ------------------------------------------------
(If any of the answers above appear in the righthand column, the applicant is to be asked
to explain on the back of this sheet why he or she feels he has established a legal residence
in this county and what will determine whether he stays or leaves after he is no longer a
student or the husband is no longer a student.)
9 AU letters followed the same format:
Dear Mr. X:
This is to notify you that the Tuscaloosa Board of Registrars has rejected your appli-
cation.
Persons who take up residence in a county for the purpose of and at the same time as
entering college are not considered under state laws and various court rulings to have
overcome the presumption of temporary residence unless they have a very definite intent
to remain, pay state income tax and acquire fixed property such as a residence, lot or busi-
ness.
The same law which limits your right to acquire a residence here also protects your
right to continue to vote in your county or residence prior to entering college and allows
you the convenience of voting by mail as long as you are a student.
10 Judge Grooms had retired in the interim.
[Vol. 31
STUDENT POWER
of the voter's membership and interest in the community." The fact is,
however, that residency requirements do not directly serve any of these in-
terests and, moreover, that the fourth stated interest inadequately describes
the real interest of the state. The state, after all, does not really care in
the abstract that the voters be informed about the issue. The interest lies
in the hope and assumption that informed voters will vote with the aware-
ness that an unwise vote will adversely affect them in their future lives.
Thus, if Samuel Lubell spent one full year studying the issues in a Tusca-
loosa election, he would be an informed, but a disinterested voter. Simi-
larly, if 70%o of the electorate were fully informed of the issues, but in-
tended to vote capriciously and then leave town, the state's interest would
hardly be satisfied. The real interest of the state here is that the voters
be those who will be affected by the outcome, so that they will vote with
considered judgment, on the knowledge they have previously obtained.
It can readily be seen that a requirement of pre-election presence does
not effectively achieve that goal; it could be achieved only by a require-
ment of post-election presence. The present waiting requirements, how-
ever, do achieve at least part of that purpose, since the presumption is
probably not unsound that one who has lived in a town for six months or
a year is unlikely to leave immediately after an election. Moreover, to
fully achieve its legitimate goal, the state would have to construct admin-
istrative machinery for determining, prior to each election, who intended
to remain afterwards. The cumbersomeness of this method is apparent,
and the state is probably justified in using the less efficient means of pre-
election presence as a crude guide to post-election intent. But the waiting
requirements do not, and cannot, totally achieve the aim of the state here.
For the purposes of the present discussion, the importance of the above
observation is its effectual reduction of the interest the state has in its
present residency laws, which only imperfectly achieve any state purpose
at all.
This does not, of course, denigrate the state's interest in limiting the
franchise to bona fide residents. Residency laws, after all, were passed
originally to prevent the "floating" vote of one who "colonized" local elec-
tions, a widespread abuse in the 1860's and 70's.12 Of course the state
must have weapons to deal effectively with the prospect of 10,000 strangers
arriving the day before an election and claiming residency. But it would seem
that the simple waiting requirement protects the state against such an invasion.
Thus, we reach our basic proposition: students who have been in the
university town long enough to meet the waiting period, and who seek to
11 Dreuding v. Devlin, 234 F. Supp. 721 (D. Md. 1964), aff'd -nem. 380 U.S. 125 (1965);
MacIeod and Wilberding, State Voting Residency Requirements and Civil Rights, 38 GEO.
WASH. L RiV. 93,95 (1969); Note, 77 HARv. L. REv. 574 (1964).
12 MacLeod and Wilberding, State Voting Residency Requirements and Civil Rights, 38
Gno. WASH. L REv. 93, 94 (1969).
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register there as voters, should be registered unless the registration agency
can show a good reason for not doing so.
The propositions put forth by the Tuscaloosa Board-lack of owner-
ship of property, lack of a permanent job in town-are neither sufficient
nor rational justifications for such a refusal.
Surely a requirement that one who satisfied the waiting period also
own property would unconstitutionally trespass upon equal protection."
A requirement of work would breach the Thirteenth Amendment and the
doctrine of unconstitutional conditions. A requirement that a single child
always be registered where his parents live would be totally irrational and
violative of due process.
Moreover, these data have no rational relationship to the determination
of residency-and surely none of interest in the future of the election
district. One could live in his own home for ten years, pay taxes, work
assiduously, and have his parents next door, and still never intend Tusca-
loosa County to be his residence. Conversely, a twenty-one year old single
student, with tax-free income, who lived in a hovel, visited his distant
parents every week, and did nothing but read, might intend the county
to be his home, and he would be entitled to register.
Once the waiting period has been met, therefore, and particularly
where the registrant has declared his intent to remain in the country indef-
initely, the state cannot employ these factors as indicia of residency be-
cause to do so effectively makes them requirements for registration. Thus,
if a registrant is rejected, as so many of the "non-native" students were, 'be-
cause he does not own property in the county, which demonstrates lack of in-
tent," the state is effectively requiring that he buy property, after which he
will be registered.
At first glance this proposal appears to play fast and loose with the
traditional law of domicile. But closer inspection of the purpose of the
state here, and of proof of intent, will demonstrate otherwise. I suggest
that, rather than using such factors as place of employment, ownership of
property, payment of taxes, etc., as affirmative indication of domicile, it is
more rational, more satisfying, and more constitutional, to use these as
negative factors. Thus, while the absence of these factors, such as prop-
erty ownership in the university town, cannot disqualify the resident, their
presence elsewhere may serve that purpose. If a man does not own real
property anywhere, the fact that he also does not own real property in
Tuscaloosa County cannot be taken as an indication that he does not re-
side in Tuscaloosa County, for if lack of real property ownership were a
proper indicia, he would not be a resident anywhere. Similarly, if a man
does not work anywhere, the fact that he also does no work in Tuscaloosa
13 See Cipriano v. City of Houmna, 395 U.S. 701 (1969); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elec-
tions, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Stewart v. Parish School Board of the Parish of St. Charles, 310
F. Supp. 1172 (E.D. La. 1970).
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County cannot be taken as an indication that he does not reside in the
county. Thus, one who is living on an annuity, or a trust fund established
by his parents, may not work, and may not plan to work, anywhere. If
his failure to work were an indicia of his residency, he would be denied the
right to vote anywhere. Simply put, the lack of external actions is not-
and by its nature cannot be-concrete indication of internal motivation; a
belief that it can be is illusory. The attempt to catch a state of mind by a
list of "factors" is futile enough of itself. But when each item on the list
of factors would be unconstitutionally infirm, the attempt becomes doubly
unsound.
But if the state cannot require ownership of property, or payment of
taxes, before registration of a person who has met the waiting require-
ment, how else might it protect its interest in assuring that only interested
voters participate in elections? Probably there is no way of assuring that
all those who cast ballots are interested in voting. But the statements of
intent to reside indefinitely in the county, which every student here was
willing to sign, appears to be the closest possible method of protecting the
state's interest. For that reason alone, its importance is enhanced. Of
course, intent is difficult to prove, and such statements could rarely be held
against the maker, but the mere fact of willingness to make the statement
is indicant of good will, if not more.
There might be some doubt as to the constitutionality of a state require-
ment of a statement of intent to reside, particularly in light of Crandall
v. Nevada,'- where the Court invalidated a state tax on outgoing residents
or tennants. On the other hand, such a statement is similar to one which
was required by Virginia in Hanmon v. Forsennius.'15  The Court there
took great pains to indicate that it was striking only the poll tax part of
the voting statute and was not passing on-or even intimating decision on
-the "residency statement" requirement.'" It is therefore at least argu-
able that such a requirement would be constitutional, even though its effect
and importance might be unknown.
In attempting to rebut the position that such a statement of intent had
putative and perhaps conclusive value, the state relied, in the principal
case, on statements that "statements of intent" were null and meaningless.
Such language is common in the cases, the most obvious example being that
of the Supreme Court in Carrington v. Rash:'
The declarations of voters concerning their intent to reside in the State
and in a particular county is often not conclusive; the election officials may
14 73 U.S. 35 (1868).
15 380 U.S. 528 (1965).
161d. at 538: "it is important to emphasize that the question presented is not whether it
would be within a state's power to... require all voters ... to file annually a certificate of
residence."
17 380 U.S. 89, 95 (1965).
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look to the actual facts and circumstances. Stratton v. Hall, 90 S.W. 2d
865, 866.
But the state's reliance on this language is grossly misplaced. Stratton
and the cases upon which it was founded were clear cases of nonresidence.
The rejected registrant simply told the board that he "intended" or
"wished" the voting district involved to be his home. Stratton, for ex-
ample, simply did not live in the county. He had moved away before he
sought to vote. He was asserting absentee property ownership as his quali-
fication to vote. In McCharen v. Mead,8 relied on by the Stratton court,
the operation of the poll tax laws set up a one-year pre-registration waiting
period. The prospective voters had not satisfied this, so their declarations
of belief that they resided in the county were ineffective. Again, in Hogg
v. Waddell, 9 the declarants simply were not present in the county.
We have already agreed that 10,000 strangers to Tuscaloosa County
could not arrive on the doorstep of the Board the day before an election,
declare simply that they 'intended" Tuscaloosa County to be their home,
and reasonably expect to be given the right to register to vote in local elec-
tions. In that instance a "mere statement of intent" would be insufficient,
since the waiting period would not have been met. Here, however, the
statements of intent were coupled with abode in the County and satisfac-
tion of the pre-registration waiting period. None of the Stratton-
McCharen-Hogg facts of nonresidence were present and the Board did
not adduce or elicit any.
Nor can the state's policy here be defended on the grounds of protect-
ing local elections from "transients." First, students are no more transient
than many other discernable groups in the country. Second, the Supreme
Court has clearly declared such a purpose impermissible under the Consti-
tution.2°
While transiency seems at first blush to be a particularly student monop-
oly, the fact is that there are many other mobile groups in society. Man-
agement trainees, for example, are almost certain to be transfered after
termination of the course, a fact which they probably know before they
arrive in the county.21 Similarly, new faculty members tend to move on,
at least from their first job, within two to four years.22 These voters have
18275 S.W. 117 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925).
19 42 S.W.2d 488 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931).
20Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 96 (1965).
2 1 
"It is dear to this court that the petitioner is an integral part of the community in which
he lives. He is no different from an engineer assigned for a three or four year term at a local
plant of a large corporation or an employee in a management training program of a multiplant
corporation who may move periodically. He is clearly not the type of unconcerned person
against whom the restrictions of the Constitution and the Election Laws are aimed." Applica-
tion of Goldhaber, 748, 55 Misc.2d 111 285 N.Y.S.2d 747, (Onondaga County Ct. 1967).
22 It is perhaps not insignificant that a recent note spoke of "residence of a student or
teacher for purposes of voting," 98 A.LR.2d 488, indicating the mobility of all members of
society. Indeed, the note spoke of two groups in the same breath: 'Teachers are not required,
any more than are students, to prove that they intend to live permanently in a school town in
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generally less control, not more, over their future plans than do students
who, barring failure, are almost assured that they will remain in the uni-
versity town for four years of undergraduate study.
23
Aside from failing to require the Board to ask other potential groups
of transients about their future plans, however, the state statutes are also
silent about the plans of young people moving, for there is no assurance
that students change residency more often or more facilely than do other
young people of the same approximate age group. Ours, after all, is a
mobile society; the most mobile persons in that society are the young,
whether college students or not.2 Thus, Donald Bogue, in a very recent
book,26 using the latest available information from the U.S. Census Bureau,
describes American society as one in which one of every five persons are
changing residence every year, 27.8 million of whom are crossing county
borders."' Of this group, the largest proportion are young people; the
migration rates for those between the ages of 20 and 34 varies from 35%
to 24%, which is substantially higher than any other age bracket.
2 7
Moreover, Bogue demonstrates that college educated young persons are
not the most likely to move. In assessing the mobility rate of Americans
between the ages of 25 and 34,28 he finds:
MALE % of FEMALE % of
WHITE POPULATION all Migrants all AMigrants
No school years completed .3 .2
Elementary school, less than 5 years 1.3 .9
Grade School, 5-8 years 12.5 9.6
High School, 1-3 years 17.1 18.4
High School, 4 years 27.5 41.3
College, 1-3 years 14.6 15.7
College, 4 years or more 26.7 13.4
order to vote there, the courts accepting as sufficient for voting purposes that they consider
it their home for the present,... while ... there." at 502.
23 Since students are almost always likely to be in the county for at least four years, the
Board's requirement that their intent to reside be "after graduation" is immediately constitu-
tionally suspect. Many students, at some point in their college career, break ties with the
parental home, yet remain uncertain as to their future plans. Courts have recognized this fact,
and acted accordingly: "Persons otherwise qualified as voters, who come to the seat of a uni-
versity mainly for the purpose of obtaining an education, who are not dependent upon their
parents for support,... who are accustomed to leave the seat of the university during vacation,
going wherever they might find employment, and returning to the university when the term
opens, regarding the seat of the university as their home, and having no purpose formed as to
their movements after completing their studies, are entitled to vote at the seat of the university."
Swan v. Bowker, 135 Neb. 405, 281 N.W. 891, 896 (1938). The court in Chomeau v. Roth, 72
S.W.2d 997, 999 (Mo. App. 1934), also recognized the inevitable result of concluding other-
wise: if a student left his prior home with no intent to return, he would be disfranchised until
he acquired a residence after graduation, since the 'home' county could hardly register him,
since he lacked the requisite intent to return. See discussion, infra.
24 Glenn and Grimes, Aging, Voting and Political Interest, 33 AMER. Soc REv. 563 (1968).
25 D. BOGUE, PRINCIPLES OF DmOGRAPHY (1969).
20 Id. at 761.
27 Id. at 762.
28 It is true that Bogue used this age bracket to avoid using college-age persons. But his
omission includes all young people, not just students. Id. at 769.
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MALE % Of FEMALE 7o Of
NONWHITE POPULATION all Migrants all Nigrants
No school years completed 1.3 .9
Elementary school, less than 5 years 7.9 4.0
Grade School, 5-8 years 24.8 21.9
High School, 1-3 years 25.4 26.5
High School, 4 years 21.1 26.8
College, 1-3 years 9.8 9.5
College, 4 years or more 9.7 10.4
The data demonstrate that it is not college graduates or even those who
have attended college that make up the bulk of migrants, or transients in
the age group 25 to 34.
Moreover, Census Bureau information indicates that the largest group
of migrants comprise "operatives and kindred workers," the second largest
consists of "craftsmen and foremen," and the third "professional and tech-
nical personnel."29  Even assuming that students are "professionals" they
are not the most mobile group in society, either in terms of profession,
or education. There is, in short, no rational basis on which the state can
base its presumption that students will move from the university town
once their schooling is complete, and deny them the right to vote, while
allowing young "operatives" without a high school education, the most
mobile part of our society, to register and vote.
Aside from failing to affirmatively protect the interest of the state in
assuming that the electorate will be interested in the election, a state policy
which precludes students from voting in the university town, thereby forc-
ing them to vote elsewhere, frustrates that interest in the place to which
students are sent to vote. Thus, a student who at some earlier point regis-
tered elsewhere may now have no concern with the affairs of that county,
and have no intention of returning to that county to live, nor be familiar
with the local issues in that county. It is, after all, in the university town
that students live, pay taxes, buy auto tags, and are affected by the decision
of the city council and various other city and county legislative delega-
tions.
Yet the state's interpretation forces these students-if they are to vote
anywhere, in any election-to return to the county which they have already
eschewed, and in which they have neither interest in nor knowledge of
the issues. Thus, the typical registration board's policy sends to innumer-
able other counties large numbers of voters who have no interest in the af-
fairs of those counties. Thus, the state interest of having knowledgeable
voters participate in local elections is actually undercut by the board's policy,
and the hope of having voters who have "membership and interest in the
community" is totally frustrated.
29 Schmidbauser, Residency Requirements for Voting and the Tensions of a Mobile Society,
61 AficE. L. REv. 823, 830 n. 10 (1963).
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In the same breath, such a policy threatens to make these students
"men without a county." For whatever else is necessary to establish domi-
cile, intent to remain or return is dearly necessary. Those students who
have not crystallized their plans, but are unsure whether three, four, or
five years hence they will return to their parents' county face a truly
grisly choice.30 They can forego voting at all, or possibly perjure them-
selves and vote in the "hometown" elections.
Moreover, there is an even more direct disfranchisement involved in
such situations. The right to vote is not a right in vacuo. It must be
meaningful; it must be in an election in which the voter has some stake,
and which will affect him in some way. Simply put, the state could not
require all residents of Tuscaloosa County to vote in the local elections in
adjoining Greene County, and vice versa. For then the right to vote, to
elect to office those who directly affect the voter, is rendered meaningless.
The voter is effectively disfranchised, whether or not he technically casts a
ballot. Students precluded from voting in the university town fall in this
group. If students are to believe in 'the system," it must first believe in
them. There is no indication in restrictive-interpretation states that it
has done so.
B. The Law of the Case
Having examined the general policy and practical considerations, let
us now turn to the current law, and determine what the position of the
courts is on this subject.
1. The Common Law of Domicile and Students
State courts faced with the dilemma of reconciling the law of domicile
with student election applicants have been split. There are several pos-
sible situations which can arise:
(a) Some students are fully committed to their parental county, and
barring unforseeable circumstances, plan to return there to spend their
lives. Their franchise is unaffected by the statute.3 1
(b) At the other end of the spectrum are those few students (most
of them in the terminal months of their academic careers) who have
found and accepted post-graduate employment in the university town.
These students will generally be registered even under the present policy.
(c) Some students, undoubtedly a considerably larger group, have
definitely decided to remain in the university town, but do not yet have
firm employment commitments (or, in the case of those who intend to be
self-employed, will never prior to leaving school have such commitments).
80 Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
31 Welch v. Shumway, 232 Ill. 54, 83 N.E. 549 (1907); Frakes v. Farragut Community Sch.
Dist., 121 N.W.2d 636 (Iowa 1963); Granby v..Amherst, 7 Mass. 1 (1810).
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These students, having no intent to return to their parental counties, can-
not properly vote there. If they do so, they may run the risk of being
charged with perjury. For the most part, this group is disfranchised.
(d) Some students are firmly committed to a third county-neither
the university town nor their original home. Under any principle of resi-
dence law, they would not qualify to vote outside the university town;
and under the challenged policy, they cannot register in the university
town. They are disfranchised (again subject to the risk of perjury or at
least subject to their willingness to vote illegally, hardly an appropriate
"essence of a democratic society").
(e) Most students really do not know where they will make their
homes after they leave the university. They may or may not have a pref-
erence for staying where they are, going back where they came from, or
going somewhere else. Like a great number of non-students, they live in
the university town, they might stay there permanently or they might not,
as opportunity presents itself. But if they state this candidly to the regis-
trars or voting officials in their home county, they shouldn't be allowed to
vote there.
The majority of courts faced with this problem have recognized and
adopted the only sensible position: "The student who gives the most usual
answer when his right to vote in a college town is challenged-that his
plans as to a future residence are uncertain, and depend upon employment
and other opportunities, but that he considers the town his home for the
present and has no intention of returning to his parents' home-will also
be allowed by the courts in most states to vote in his college town." 32
In determining the intent to make a home in the college county, courts
in other states have recognized that the old concept of the "semicloistered
college life" has little to do with the modes of life of many college stu-
dents today. When many of the cases restrictive of student registration
were decided our society was far less mobile, and the general assumption,
which surfaces in some of the cases, was that the student would return to his
county of birth at the end of his college education. That assumption is
simply no longer valid.
2. The Constitutional Aspects of the Problem
The Supreme Court has developed a particularly stringent application
of the equal protection dause in voting cases. Characterizing the electoral
franchise as being:
32 Annot., 98 ALR2d 488, 497-98 (1953). See, e.g., Chomeau v. Roth, 72 S.W.2d 997 (Mo.
App. 1934); Swan v. Bowker, 135 Neb. 405, 281 N.W. 891 (1938); Re Robbins v. Chamber-
lain, 297 N.Y. 108, 75 N.E.2d 617 (1947); Application of Goldhaber, 55 Misc.2d 111, 285
N.Y.S.2d 747 (Onondaga County, 1967); State ex rel May v. Jones, 16 Ohio App.2d 140, 242
N.E.2d 672 (1968). Cf. Pedigo v. Grimes, 113 Ind. 148, 13 N.E. 700 (1887); Everman v.




dose to the core of our constitutional system.33 [and] the essence of a
democratic society . . . [andl the heart of representative government.34
The Court has discarded usual norms of equal protection:
[T~he general presumption of constitutionality afforded state statutes and
the traditional approval given state classifications if the Court can con-
ceive of a "rational basis" for the distinctions made are not applicable.
See Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966). The
presumption of constitutionality and the approval given "rational" dasssi-
fications in other types of enactments are based on an assumption that the
institutions of state government are structured so as to represent fairly all
the people. However, when the challenge to the statute is in effect a chal-
lenge of this basic assumption, the assumption can no longer serve as the
basis for presuming constitutionality.35
Before the right to vote may be validly restricted, at least four ele-
ments must coalesce:
(a) The state interest relied on to justify the restrictive classification
must be "compelling,"0 not merely "rational" or elegitimate.
'aT
(b) Even assuming a sufficiently compelling state interest, the classi-
fication must be closely scrutinized to determine whether it is necessary,
and the purpose has been accomplished with "precision; 3 8 e.g., "whether
all those excluded are in fact substantially less interested or affected than
those the statute includes [as voters]." 9
(c) The state, not the challenging party, has the burden of demon-
strating that the standards have been met.40
3 3 Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 96 (1965).
34 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964).
35 Kramer v. Union Free School Dist, 395 U.S. 621, 627-28 (1969).
36 Compare the First Amendmentes requirement of an "overriding and compelling state
interest" in, e.g., DeGregory v. New Hampshire, 383 U.S. 825 (1966). In fact, the First
Amendment is an inevitable element of voting cases. The rationale is expressed in Stromberg
v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931); '"he maintenance of the opportunity for free
political discussions to the end that government may be responsive to the will of the people
and that changes may be obtained by lawful means ... is ... fundamental .. " That voting
and the First Amendment are inseparable is explicit in Hadnott v. Amos, 394 U.S. 358, 364
(1969); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968); Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116 (1966).
Where the franchise is not taken away, and the only question is one of ease of voting, the
less stringent test still applies. McDonald v. Bd. of Election Comm'rs of Chicago, 394 U.S.
802 (1969).
3 7 See, e.g., Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969); Kramer v. Union Free School
Dirt., 395 U.S. 621 (1969); Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966).
The California Supreme Court has recently been persuaded that, in view of this new test, Las-
siter v. Northhampton County Election Bd., 360 U.S. 45 (1959), which upheld a literacy test,
is no longer good law. Castro v. California, 38 U.S.LW. 2522 (Cal. Sup. Ct. March 24, 1970).
3 8 Wesberryv. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 18 (1964).
39Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 632 (1969). See, e.g., Cipriano v.
City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1968); Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965).
4 0 See, e.g., Kramer v. Union Free School Distr., 395 U.S. 621, 633: "Nor do appellees offer
any justification for the exclusion of seemingly interested and informed residents.S.." See
also, Hadnott v. Amos, 394 U.S. 358, 364 (1969); Gaston County v. United States, 395 U.S. 285(1969).
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(d) The prerequisites, procedures, and conditions for the use of the
franchise must not be more burdensome, confusing or cumbersome than
is necessary. 41
Measured by these standards, the exclusionary interpretation of the
Tuscaloosa Board seems inexorably unconstitutional. As already seen, the
exclusion of students as a group serves no legitimate state policy, and in-
deed frustrates the only policy or interest which the state general resi-
dency statute protects: allowing interested and involved voters to vote in
elections which concern them. Moreover, in achieving the other three
putative ends of residency requirements, the state may use the much less
drastic methods of the waiting period, without further requirements as to
intent or domicile. It should not be allowed to sweep too broadly, strik-
ing groups which, at least superficially, appear to fall without the state
purpose.
Viewed from an equal protection standpoint, the classification of stu-
dents as "more transient" similarly fails. The classification does not, as we
have seen, deal with either the most transient, or the most interested. In
several recent cases, the Supreme Court has addressed itself specifically to
the precision which is necessary in classifications affecting the franchise.
In Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15,42 the Court was faced with
a state statute which restricted voters in school district elections to those
who (1) owned or leased taxable real property or (2) are parents or had
custody of children enrolled in the local public schools. Leaving aside
the question of whether the state could properly limit the franchise, even
in a "special" or "limited" election,4 3 the Court held that the elimination
was too broad in this instance:
Whether classifications allegedly limiting the franchise to those resi-
dent citizens 'primarily interested' deny those excluded equal protection
of the law depends, inter alia, on whether all those excluded are in fact
substantially less interested or affected than those the statute includes. In
other words, the classifications must be tailored so that the exclusion of
appellant and members of his class is necessary to achieve the articulated
state goal. Section 2012 does not meet the exacting standard of preci-
sion we require of statutes which selectively distribute the franchise. The
classifications in § 2012 permit inclusion of many persons who have,
at best, a remote and indirect interest in school affairs and, on the other
hand, exclude others who have a distinct and direct interest in the school
meeting decisions."4
41 See, e.g., Had-nott v. Amor, 394 U.S. 358 (1969); Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections,
393 U.S. 663 (1966); Harmon v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528 (1965); Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S.
268, 275 (1939). Compare the First Amendment doctrine of not allowing unnecessarily
burdensome conditions particularly as applied in cases involving permit requirements, e.g.,
Shuttlesworth v. City of Birrmingbam, 394 U.S. 147 (1969).
42395 U.S. 621 (1969).
43 See, infra.
44 395 U.S. 621, 632.
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In two later cases, the Court followed this reasoning. In Cipriano v.
City of Houma,4r restriction of the franchise in bond elections to property
owners was struck down. In Evans v. Cornman,46 the Court struck down
a decision by the Permanent Board of Registry of Montgomery County
that persons living on the grounds of the National Institutes of Health
were on a federal enclave and, as such, not Maryland residents. In view
of the statistical evidence adduced earlier, as well as the general exclusion
of so many people from the franchise, it is doubtful whether an interpre-
tation of the kind challenged in Harris could be sustained.
The Court has spoken only once directly to the issue of voting and
transiency. In Carrington v. Rash,47 the Court invalidated a Texas stat-
ute which raised an irrebutable presumption of nonresidency against mili-
tary personnel, holding that the state must at least give any person who
wished to establish Texas as his residence, an opportunity to present evi-
dence as to his domicile. The irrebutable presumption technique was too
crude a weapon. The Court specifically discredited the idea that attempt-
ing to prevent "transients" from voting in local elections was proper, 48
requiring the restriction to be "reasonable in light of its purpose." 49  The
state, said the Court, could not fence out from the franchise 0 those who
were dearly interested in the outcome of the election.
The Carrington case involved an irrebuttable presumption, while the
present exclusion of student voters involves only a rebuttable presumption.
It might, therefore, be considered that Carrington, if not directly adverse to
students here, is at least not authority for their position. But a closer read-
ing will perhaps indicate more support for the proposition which invalidates
exclusion of students than believed. In the first place, military personnel are
totally at the mercy of their superiors, unable to stay in any given locale for
one day more than their orders permit. Students, on the other hand, are not
so controlled. Even if their tenure at the university may be terminated by the
administration, they may remain in the town as long as they consider desirable.
Of course at that point they would no longer be students, according to the
exclusionary rule. But in all probability they would have to remain in the
town for at least six months, in addition to the time already spent there, be-
fore they could be registered, since their time at school does not count as
residency. Secondly, the Carrington case indicated a willingness, when the
1new" tests had not yet been applied to the franchise, to specifically circum-
scribe it with the most durable protections. In that event, it demonstrates
48 395 U.S. 701. Cf. City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204,. See also Stewart v.
Parish School Board of the Parish of St. Charles, 310 F. Supp. 1172 (E.D. La. 1970).
46 398 U.S. 419 (1970).
4T 380 U.S. 89 (1965).
481d. at 95-97.
49 Id. at 93.
50 Id. at 94.
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again, as I have already suggested, that the burden shifts to the state to jus-
tify its exclusion-that now, the state cannot require the applicant to carry
the burden once he has demonstrated compliance with the waiting period.
Carrington, therefore, seems to at least indicate hospitality for bringing the
broadest protection possible to excluded groups on the basis of "transiency."
The Cornman case indicates yet another branch of the argument
against the interpretation adopted by the District Court in Harris, a new
view of the meaning of the franchise, upon which we have already touched.
This is the requirement, becoming more explicit with each case, that those
who have an "interest" in an election should be allowed to vote as resi-
dents, unless there are clearly compelling reasons to the contrary. This is
exceptionally close to the position previously outlined here-that sufficing
the waiting period should meet all legitimate criteria of the state.
Cornman itself involved the decision of the Montgomery County Per-
manent Board of Registry that persons living on the federal enclave at the
National Institute of Health were not residents of the state of Maryland
for purposes of enfranchisement. Several perturbed voters sought a de-
claratory judgment that this application of the Maryland voter residency
law was unconstitutional. The lower court held for the plaintiff-
applicants,5 and the,state appealed.
The Court's opinion is somewhat confusing. At issue in the case, at
least as originally propounded, was the residency status of the NIH voters.
The Court apparently dismissed that question early in its decision, saying
that:
They are not residents of Maryland only if the NIH grounds ceased to
be a part of Maryland when the enclave was created. However, that 'fic-
tion of a state within a state' was specifically rejected by this Court in
Howard v. Commissioners of Louisville, 344 U.S. 624, 627 (1953), and
it cannot be resurrected here to deny appellees the right to vote.52
This would seem to settle the question. But Maryland then apparently
made another argument, which was not directly raised by the case as framed
by the Court, that Maryland could nevertheless exclude these residents
because they were not 'primarily or substantially interested in or affected
51 Cornnran v. Dawson, 295 F. Supp. 654 (D. Md. 1969). The District Court declared, at
569: "A state may not subject an individual who resides within its geographical boundaries
to substantial obligations of citizenship and at the same time deny such individual the correla-
tive right to exercise a voice in defining the nature and extent of such obligations." Accord,
Arapajola v. McMenamin, 113 Cal. App. 2d 824, 249 P.2d 318 (1952); Rothfels v. Southworth,
11 Utah2d 169, 356 P.2d 612 (1960).
52 398 U.S. 419 at 421-22. The Howard case was not really determinative of either issue in
Cornman, since it involved the ability of the City of Louisville to levy an occupational tax
against residents of a federal enclave. The case was controlled by 4 U.S.C. §§ 105-110,
known as the Buck Act, which explicitly gave the city the right to levy such a tax on such per-
sons, without declaring whether or not they were "residents." Indeed, the need for special
legislation to allow state taxation would seem to indicate non-residency. At any rate, no such
statute was present in Cornman, and me state, moreover, was attempting to have the federal
enclave inhabitants declared non-residents, not residents.
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by electoral decison." The state relied on several facts, including the
fact that NIH residents did not pay real property taxes, and that NIH
residents could only be prosecuted in federal courts by federal authorities
for a crime committed on NIH grounds. The Court rejected both of these
arguments, by pointing to the "numerous and vital ways in which NIH
residents are affected by electoral decisions." These voters, said the Court,
are as concerned with state spending... as other Maryland residents....
[Theyl are required to register their automobiles in Maryland and obtain
drivers permits and license plates from the State; they are subject to the
process and jurisdiction of state courts; they themselves can resort to
those courts in divorce and child adoption proceedings; and they send
their children to Maryland public schools. 53
Students in a university town are no less directly affected. They too
are required to register their automobiles in the university town or county,
and to pay the university town or county sales tax. They are directly af-
fected by the way in which the local officials, particularly the police and ju-
dicial officials, operate. The situation at the University of Alabama is typical.
In the last year there have been literally hundreds of arrests of students,
both involved in political demonstrations and for the usual college-age
frivolities. These students are directly affected by the political views and
the philosophical attitudes which the local police officials and the mayor
hold. Their futures are likely to be directly affected by whether the police
take a lenient or tough attitude toward their activities, whatever they be.
It is in the university town, for all practical purposes, that their future
is made, not in the "home town" from which they emerged several years
previous.
The Supreme Court's stress in Cornman on the relationship between
"interest" and "residence" which it had already begun to discuss in Kramer
and Cipriano, is a salutary one. It seeks to make democracy more re-
sponsive by giving to those who are directly affected by decisions the
power of the ballot over the decision-makers. The Court, in Cornman,
could have dismissed the second argument briefly, with a short curt sen-
tence or two to the effect that Maryland had not carried its burden here.
Instead, the Court seemingly went out of its way to lay down criteria,
indicia, for the determination of what persons should be allowed to vote
in what elections. Of course, the case does not technically control the
student case at hand here, since the Court apparently decided that the NIH
dwellers were Maryland residents before going into the issue of "Interest
and concern." But the Court's basic stance promotes the belief that stu-
dents are residents where they spend nine months, or more, of every year,
at least when their intent is unclear or undetermined. Cornman, Kramer
and Cipriano all seem to so hold.
53Id. at 424.
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Still another infirmity in the present posture of the law is indicated by
the fact that the United States Census Bureau, for purposes of counting
population, considers students as residents of the University townY4 What-
ever impact this might have otherwise on the merits of the case, the fact
is that to allow students to be counted for purposes of determining district-
ing but not to be counted for purposes of electing the officials from that dis-
trict might well contravene the "one-man, one-vote" thesis of the Supreme
Court.5 Thus, for example, let us assume that the Census Bureau finds
10,000 students and 40,000 non-students in town A, and 50,000 non-stu-
dents in town B. Now, assuming that all students are "non-native", this
means that Congressman B is being elected by 50,000 people, whereas
Congressman A is being elected by 40,000. Townspeople in B, therefore,
are having their votes diluted by 20%. This gross disparity is obviously in-
consistent with the Court's mandate in the voting cases, and would arguably
be enough to strike down the districting.
CONCLUSION
There are voices in this country declaring that the political process is
dead, dosed to the cries of the young and the new voter. Many young
people, including vast portions of the student population, have been said
to be apathetic about the power of the ballot, believing that no meaningful
reforms can be achieved through the franchise, through the system. If
students were given the ability, at an early age in their college career, to
help manage the university towns in which they reside, if they were able
to make their voices heard as a bloc, with the power of the vote behind
it, some of this distress might be alleviated, and it might occur that we
could reach out and pull many of these disenchanted ones back. Certainly
that is the thought behind the lowering of the voting age to 18. But
that action may well be sterile, at least for many of the college young, if
they are forced to vote in a place to which they hold no real allegiance.
This, again, will appear to be the 'system's" method of giving with one
hand and taking away with the other. For of what use is a vote in Fair-
banks, Alaska, if Nome is where your heart is ?56
54 U.S. Bureau of the Census, Policy Statement (1966), conveyed to the author by letter
from Mr. Conrad Tauba, of the Bureau, August, 1970. California has recently agreed. Opinion
No. 70/115 of California Attorney General Thomas Lynch, August 12, 1970 (mimeo).
55 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
r; This article has been directed at intra-state, intra-county discrimination. The analysis
clearly applies, however, to inter-state students as well, and with perhaps more force because of
Shapirco v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). It should be noted, of course, that residency for
purposes of tuition may be governed by considerations not present in the issue posed here.
Colorado, after providing that a student may change his residence simply by filing a sworn
affidavit with the county clerk, Colo. Rev. Stat. 49-3-4(1) (1963), adds, id., sec. (3), that "No
provision in this section shall apply in the determination of residence or non-residence status
... for any college or university purpose." See Kirk v. Calif. Bd. of Regents, 273 Cal. App. 2d




A total of 24 states, including Alabama, have provisions similar to Tit. 17, sec.
17 of the Alabama Code. Most are identical in wording. This addendum lists
these states, and citations to cases or other interpretations of the words. Addition-
ally, interesting variations of the wording, or supplemental statutory provisions are
recorded. Finally, in those states which do not have statutes specifically dealing
with student voter residence, a cursory attempt has been made to list relevant case
law. In those states, however, the listing is not intended to be exhaustive.
Alabama
Tit. 17, sec. 17
Alaska
Elections, sec. 15.05.020 (4)
Arizona
Const., Art. 7, sec. 3
Clark v. Clark, 71 Ariz. 194, 225 P.2d 486 (1951).
Arkansas
Ptak v. Jameson, 215 Ark. 292, 220 S.W. 592 (1949).
California
Cal. Election Code, sec. 14283. "This section shall not be construed to pre-
vent a student at an institution of learning from qualifying as an elector
where he resides while attending that institution, when in fact the student
has abandoned his former residence."
Colorado
Rev. Stat. 49 - 3 - 4 (1)
(2) : (However) . . . if a student shall . . . file with the county clerk a
written affidavit under oath . . . that he has established a domicile in that
state, that he has abandoned his parental or former home as a domicile,
and that he is not registered.., in any other political subdivision, of this
state or any other state .... (he shall be registered).
(3) : No provision in this section shall apply in the determination of resi-
dence or nonresidence status ... for any college or university purpose.
Parsons v. People, 30 Colo. 388, 70 P. 689 (1902).
Gray v. Huntley, 77 Colo. 478, 238 P. 53 (1925).
Idaho
Code, sec. 34-403
Hawkins v. Winstead, 65 Idaho 12, 138 P.2d 972 (1943).
Illinois
Anderson v. Pifer, 315 Ill. 164, 146 N.E. 171 (1925).
Welch v. Shumway, 232 Ill. 148, 83 N.E. 549 (1907).
Indiana
Pedyo v. Grimes, 13 N.E. 700 (1887).
Iowa
Frakes v. Farragut Community Sch. Dist., 121 N.W.2d 636 (Iowa 1963).
Vanderpoel v. O'Hanlon, 53 Iowa 246, 5 N.W. 119 (1880).
Louisiana
Holmes v. Pino, 131 La. 687, 60 So. 78 (1912).
Maine
Stat., T. 21, sec. 242 (4)
Sanders v. Getchall, 76 Me. 158 (1884).
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Massachusetts
Putnam v. Johnson, 10 Mass. 488 (1813).
Opinion of the Justices, 46 Mass. 587 (1843).
Michigan
Comp. L. Ann. sec. 168.11 (b)
O'Brien ex. tel. Miller v. Miller, 266 Mich. 127, 253 N.W. 241 (1934).
People v. Osborn, 170 Mich. 143, 135 N.W. 921 (1912).
Minnesota
Const., Art. 7, sec. 3
1922 Op. Atty. Gen., No. 274, p. 218
Missouri
Const., Art. 8, sec. 6
New v. Corrough, 370 S.W.2d 323 (1963).
Chomeau v. Roth, 230 Mo. App. 709, 72 S.W.2d 997 (1934).
Goben v. Murrell, 195 Mo. App. 104, 190 S.W. 986, reh.
den. 195 Mo. App. 104, 197 S.W. 432 (1916).
Montana
Const., Art. IX, sec. 3
Nebraska
Swan v. Bowker, 135 Neb. 405, 281 N.W. 891 (1938).
Nevada
Rev. Stat. 293.487
1920 Atty. Gen. Op. 168
New Hampshire
Rev. Stat. Ann. 54: 10
New Mexico
Const., Art. VII, sec. 4
New York Consol. Law. S.
Elec. Law, sec. 151
Robbins v. Chamberlain, 297 N.Y. 103, 75 N.E.2d 617 (1947).
Watermeyer v. Mitchell, 275 N.Y. 73, 9 N.E.2d 783 (1937).
Re Blankford, 241 N.Y. 180, 149 N.E. 415 (1925).
Re Garvey, 147 N.Y. 117, 41 N.E. 439 (1895).
Re Goodman, 146 N.Y. 284, 40 N.E. 769 (1895).
Re Goldhaber, 55 Misc.2d 11, 285 N.Y.S.2d 747 (1967).
Reiner v. Bd. of Election, 54 Misc.2d 1030, 283 N.Y.S.2d 963, affirmed, 28
A.D.2d 1095, 285 N.Y.S.2d 584, affirmed 20 N.Y.2d 865, 285 N.Y.2d 95,
231 N.E.2d 785 (1967).
Re Hoffman, 187 Misc. 799, 65 N.Y.S.2d 107 (1946).
Re Gardiner, 101 Misc. 414, 167 N.Y.S. 26 (1917).
Re Singer, 118 N.Y.S.2d 91 (1952).
North Carolina
Gen. Stat. sec. 163-57 (7) relates to teachers, but not students
Ohio
Rev. Code Ann. 3503.05
State ex. rel. May v. Jones, 16 Ohio App. 2d 140, 45 O.O.2d 427, 242 N.E.2d
612 (1968).




Penn. Stat. Ann. (Purd) T. 25, sec. 2813
In re Absentee Ballot of Schrum, 79 York 62 (1966).
South Carolina
Const., Art. 2, sec. 7
1963 Op. Atty Gen. Nos. 1709, 1729, pp. 173, 216
1962 Op. Atty. Gen. No. 1585, p. 157
Texas
Vernons' Stat. Ann., Elec. Code, Art. 5.08
. . A student shall not be considered to have acquired a residence at the
place where he lives while attending school unless he intends to remain
there and to make that place his home indefinitely after he ceases to be a
student." Amended in 1967, after Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965).
Clark v. Stubbs, 131 S.W.2d 663 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939).
Utah
Code Ann. 20 - 2 - 14 (2)
Vermont
Stat., Ann. T. 17, sec. 66
"Such student may adopt the town where such college or seminary is located
as his place of residence by filing in the clerk's office.., his declaration to
that effect ... "
1968 Op. Atty. Gen. No. 80
Virginia
Const., sec. 24
Kegley v. Johnson, 207 Va. 54, 147 S.E.2d 735 (1966).
Washington
Rev. Stat. Ann. 29. 01. 40
SWisconsin
Seibold v. Wahl, Wis. 159 N.W. 546 (1916).
Wyoming
Code 22 - 118.3 (k) (2)
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